







An important aspect of the perceived problem with medical malpractice
litigation is the manner in which malpractice claims are resolved.' Following
the first medical malpractice crisis in the mid-1970s and the more recent
difficulties with insurance costs and availability, the majority of states enacted
legislation affecting the procedures used to resolve malpractice claims. 2
Procedural reforms have been motivated by a variety of concerns, including:
(1) perceptions of an increasing number of medical malpractice claims filed;
(2) fear that a large number of small claims are never filed because of the high
transaction costs associated with litigation; (3) the unpredictability of litigated
outcomes; (4) the perceived inconsistency of jury damage awards; and (5) the
potential impact of the litigation system on the availability of malpractice
insurance and the delivery of medical care. The procedural changes vary
considerably. Some reforms were intended to have substantive effects; 3 other
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changes can be characterized as procedural "fine tuning" to correct perceived
problems with present procedural rules.4 Whatever the motivation, attempts
to alter the way medical malpractice claims are processed have been an
integral part of legislative tort reform.
An important aspect of the procedural reform agenda is a general interest
in developing new mechanisms that serve, directly or indirectly, to channel
malpractice claims away from the courts. These more innovative changes
adopt many of the procedural forms and goals of what is now termed
"alternative dispute resolution" ("ADR"). One motivation for developing
alternative forums for claims processing is the commonly held belief that the
traditional litigation system is inefficient and inequitable, 5 that is, that it fails
to provide prompt redress to those injured as a result of medical negligence.
Legislation has sought specifically to speed the processing and resolution of
claims, to reduce costs to parties and state court systems, and to improve the
quality of decisionmaking in malpractice cases.6 A central purpose of any
alternative process is the settlement of claims before trial.
The most common alternative procedures have been arbitration and the
required submission of malpractice claims to pretrial screening panels.
Despite repeated claims about arbitration's potential benefits, apparently few
health care claimants have chosen to agree to binding arbitration, and thus
little information is available regarding its impact. 7 Pretrial screening panels,
discussion of the various measures adopted by several states, see Robinson, 49 L & Contemp Probs
at 21 (cited in note 1).
4. For example, some states have imposed special pleading requirements, restructured the
discovery process, or limited those able to serve as experts. Id at 21-24; see generally Walter
Gellhorn, Medical Malpractice Litigation (U.S.)-Medical Mishap Compensation (N.Z.), 73 Cornell L Rev
170, 170-77 (1987-88). Yet another approach is to require a certificate of merit, an expert panel
review, or an affidavit from a medical expert certifying the merit of the claim to ensure review before
claims are filed. Patricia M. Danzon, The Frequency and Severity of Medical Malpractice Claims 45 (RAND,
1982); William Curran, Screening Panels in Malpractice Cases: Some Disturbing Progress Reports, 302 New
EngJ Med 954 (1980).
5. Inefficiencies arise in part through excessive transaction costs, which have been estimated to
be as high as 70%. Jeffrey O'Connell, An Alternative to Abandoning Tort Liability: Elective No-fault
Insurance for Many Kinds of Injuries, 60 Minn L Rev 501, 503-10 (1976). See also James S. Kakalik &
Nicholas M. Pace, Costs and Compensation Paid in Tort Litigation 55 (RAND, 1986). See generally Am
Med Ass'n, A Proposed Alternative To The Civil Justice System For Resolving Medical Liability Disputes: A Fault-
Based, Administrative System (Am Med Ass'n, 1988) (Specialty Society Medical Liability Project Report).
6. Legislative reform often encompasses numerous conflicting goals. Cause and effect
relations among the many variables affecting claims processing are not well understood, and
legislation rarely articulates program goals clearly. Furthermore, program evaluations and
assessments rarely examine the impact of new institutional arrangements on the people who use
them. Nevertheless, the potential of diversion programs to achieve all or some of these goals has
been a major factor in recent state experiments with ADR.
7. Consumers seem reticent to give up their rights to court hearings; others have challenged
the constitutionality of arbitration proceedings. Critics argue that arbitration agreements are
unenforceable contracts and that binding arbitration in the medical malpractice area will lead to
stasis in health care. Nicholas Terry, The Technical and Conceptual Flaws of Medical Malpractice
Arbitration, 30 St Louis U L Rev 571, 630-31 (1986). Patricia Danzon has written that arbitration
statutes appear to result in increased claim frequency but reduced overall average magnitude of
claims. She adds that additional information is needed to prove that arbitration schemes have a
systematic effect on medical malpractice claims. Patricia M. Danzon, The Frequency and Severity of
Medical Malpractice Claims: New Evidence, 49 L & Contemp Probs 57, 77-78 (Spring 1986).
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in various forms, operate in approximately half the states; their purpose is to
review malpractice claims early in the litigation process to identify and
discourage meritless claims, as well as to identify meritorious claims that
might be settled early.8 As with arbitration, there is little empirical evidence
about the efficacy of these procedures. 9
There is a growing interest among state court administrators, practitioner
groups, and health care professionals in exploring other alternative means of
processing and settling malpractice claims. This interest may result in part
from frustration with the arbitration and pretrial screening schemes just
described, and in part from tales of successful innovative ADR techniques
used in other contexts. Recently, reform discussions have focused on
mediation. In mediation, parties participate directly in what is thought to be
an informal and voluntary dispute resolution process that may offer a novel
and promising approach to resolving claims.
General interest in mediation has been manifested in a number of
statutory reforms labelled "mediation" that apply directly or indirectly to
malpractice claims. Recent statutory provisions adopting such schemes
emerge in part from state legislative confrontations over two major and
separable social and legal phenomena: first, recurring calls for innovative and
effective processing of medical malpractice claims, and, second, legislative
initiatives mandating alternative dispute resolution processes for all or
selected disputes. To date, we know little about how these legislative schemes
operate and what has been accomplished. Opinion on the likelihood of
program success is mixed; what to some seems the perfect match of case type
and process appears to others incongruous, a waste of time, or dangerous.
This article begins with an overview of traditional mediation and an
examination of the theoretical benefits of mediation as a procedural response
to the problems of resolving medical malpractice claims. The article then
explores Wisconsin's recent efforts to resolve medical malpractice claims by
requiring their mediation. After describing the statute enacting the
procedure and the methodology used to study the system, the article
evaluates the statute's impact on settlements and describes the mediation
process at work. The data derive from statistical reports of the Wisconsin
panel system as well as observations and interviews from an ongoing
empirical study.
8. Panels typically consist of lawyers, physicians, retired judges, and insurers. They render
decisions on liability and sometimes on damages, but those decisions are not usually binding unless
both parties agree. Either party may take an unsuccessful claim at this level to the appropriate state
court, but sanctions may be imposed on those who do no better in court than they would have under
a panel decision.
9. Panel procedures typically require significant investments of time and money in preparing
for the hearing. Pretrial screening panels have been criticized as a costly additional hurdle. Martin
Redish, Legislative Response to the Medical Malpractice Insurance Crisis: Constitutional Challenges, 55 Tex L
Rev 759, 765 (1977); James A. Henderson, Jr., Agreements Changing the Forum for Resolving Malpractice
Claims, 49 L & Contemp Probs 243, 249-50 (Spring 1986). Nevertheless, recent commentators
continue to urge their adoption. Neil Schor, Health Care Providers and Alternative Dispute Resolution:
Needed Medicine to Combat Medical Malpractice Claims, 4 Ohio St J on Disp Resolution 65 (1988).
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The article then analyzes the apparent failure of the Wisconsin system to
settle claims and the general implications of this failure for the viability of
mediation in the malpractice context. The perceived failure of Wisconsin's
approach is not necessarily an indictment of the prospects for mediation in
medical malpractice cases, because the label "mediation" only roughly
corresponds to the actual structure and operation of Wisconsin's process.
The article concludes by focusing on possible features of a more viable
mediation program.
II
THE THEORETICAL BENEFITS OF MEDIATION AS A PROCEDURAL
APPROACH TO RESOLVING MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CLAIMS
As traditionally understood, mediation is a voluntary, nonbinding process
in which a neutral party-the mediator-works with disputants toward
resolving or mitigating their conflict in a mutually satisfactory settlement.
Mediation attempts to remove the parties' adversarial posturing and replace it
with a harmonious relationship. This transformation may take place by an
explicit agreement, a reciprocal acceptance of the "social norms" relevant to
the parties' relationship, or by a mutual recognition of a new or more
perceptive understanding of one another's problems.' 0 The variables that
shape mediation are so numerous that it is more helpful to view mediation not
as a specific model but rather as a style or approach to dispute resolution."
The exact format of the mediation session will depend upon the mediators,
their experience, the parties, and the type of dispute involved.
Mediation is thought to provide opportunities for both parties to benefit
from the resolution of the dispute. For this reason, it is often referred to as a
"win/win" process. It offers this advantage because it is not bound by the
rules of either procedural or substantive law, by the rules of evidence, or by
certain assumptions that dominate the adversary process. The parties "may,
with the help of their mediator, consider a comprehensive mix of their needs,
interests, and whatever else they deem relevant" to the dispute.' 2 The
ultimate authority in mediation belongs to the participants themselves, and
they may fashion a unique solution without being either strictly governed by
precedent or unduly concerned with the precedent they may set for others.
Through a process of integrative bargaining, the parties can often reach a
mutually satisfactory solution. 13 Unlike the adjudicative process, mediation
need not emphasize who is right or wrong, or who wins or loses. Rather,
mediation allows parties to strive for a workable solution that meets both
10. Lon Fuller, Mediation-Its Forms and Functions, 44 S Cal L Rev 305, 308 (1971).
11. Jay Folberg & Alison Taylor, Mediation 130 (Jossey-Bass, 1984).
12. Id at 10.
13. See generally Roger Fisher & William Ury, Getting to Yes (Houghton Mifflin, 1981).
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parties' particular needs and interests.' 4 Equally important to some are
mediation's goals of reconciliation and personal transformation.' 5
The mediator's role can vary significantly depending on the nature of the
dispute. One issue for the mediator is to determine whether to focus on the
parties' immediate or long-term needs. Mediators typically are also involved
in probing the disputants' subjective understanding of the dispute. The
mediator then assists the parties in developing solutions to the conflict,
applying neutral standards to these needs and beliefs as a means of
developing the middle ground upon which the parties can agree and settle
their dispute. By definition, the mediator does not have the formal authority
to render a decision in the case. The mediator generally does not even give
an advisory opinion on the merits of the dispute, unless requested to do so by
the parties, and then typically only after the parties fail to reach an accord
voluntarily.
Mediation is often believed to work best in a dispute in which the parties
have had a significant prior relationship or when the parties have an interest
in continuing a relationship in the future.' 6 For this reason, mediation has
been widely employed in disputes between family members, neighbors, and
landlords and tenants. Indeed, an increasing number of states have passed
legislation requiring mandatory mediation in specific dispute contexts,
including farmer-lender and agricultural property cases,' 7 and family law
matters such as divorce and child custody cases.' 8 Several states also have
enacted sweeping legislation authorizing or mandating mediation generally in
civil cases. ' 9
Mandatory mediation's recent allure stems from hopes that it will serve as
a costless precondition to more formal litigation, and reflects a growing belief
that some disputes are better resolved through a consensual process. The
type of mediation described above can be thought about as an ideal type-an
optimistic rendering of a process that in its voluntary and now mandatory
14. Folberg & Taylor, Mediation at 10 (cited in note I1).
15. Robert Baruch Bush, Defining Quality in Dispute Resolution: Taxonomies and Anti-Taxonomies of
Quality Arguments, 66 Denver U L Rev 335 (1989). Bush asserts generally that few commentators,
dispute scholars, or court administrators have paid any attention to the alternative vision of
mediation as a way to expand personal and individual understanding and to transform participants as
part of a process of moral education. Emphasizing mediation as a tool of eficiency and an adjunct to
the individual-rights focused court system does not allow for personal growth and transformation;
the latter process relies on finding value in being connected to and serving others. Robert Baruch
Bush, Mediation and Adjudication, Dispute Resolution and Ideology: An Imaginary Conversation, 3 J Contemp
Legal Issues 1 (1989).
16. John S. Murray, Alan Scott Rau & Edward F. Sherman, Process of Dispute Resolution: The Role of
Lawyers 287 (Foundation Press, 1989).
17. Nat'l Inst Disp Resolution, Farmer-Lender Mediation, Forum (Fall 1990).
18. Patricia Winks, Divorce Mediation: A Non-adversay Procedure for the No-fault Divorce, 19J Fam L
615 (1980-81); Lenard Marlow, The Rule of Law in Divorce Mediation, 9 Mediation Q 5 (1985); see
generally Comment, Mediation: New Process for High School Disciplinary Expulsions, 84 Nw U L Rev 736
(1990) (authored by James McMasters).
19. Fla Stat § 44.302 (West, 1988); Texas Civil Prac & Rem Code Ann § 154 (Vernon, Supp
1989); Okla Stat Ann App R 7(d) (West, Supp 1990); Minn Stat Ann § 484.74 (West, Supp 1990). To
date, most have survived constitutional challenge. See Dwight Golann, Making Alternative Dispute
Resolution Mandatoy: The Constitutional Issues, 68 Or L Rev 487 (1989).
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versions actually takes numerous forms. Not everyone feels that mandatory
mediation is a panacea or an unmixed blessing to litigants; nor have all of the
claims for mandatory mediation been proven decisively. 20 Indeed, there is a
growing debate over the use of mediation techniques and whether it is
appropriate to require mediation in conjunction with existing litigation.2 1
Thoughtful commentators consider both the strengths and potential
weaknesses of mandatory schemes invoking mediation, and the need to build
in protections for fairness, accountability, and quality of the mediation
services rendered. Others note that mediation may be quite different in a
mandatory context than in a voluntary one, when the judicial administrative
motive for its invocation is the goal of reducing court congestion, and urge
careful contextualized study of mediation in different settings. 22
Despite these concerns, mediation has found significant support in public
and governmental circles; thus it is not surprising that in recent years a
number of states have enacted programs ostensibly purporting to encourage
or require "mediation" as an alternative forum for resolving medical
malpractice claims. 23 Some states have optional mediation of medical
malpractice claims, while many more have general mediation programs that
cover medical malpractice cases as well. 24
The basic theory of mediation, with its emphasis on reconciliation and
integrative bargaining, might, in the first instance, seem an unlikely approach
to resolving most medical malpractice cases. For example, in the typical case
involving birth-related injuries of a newborn child, the main issue is generally
a question of whether or not the physician adhered to the applicable standard
of care. The claimed damages in such a case could easily total millions of
dollars. Often there would not be a long-standing relationship between the
doctor and patient and probably no future relationship is anticipated. Given
the parties' relationship and the issues, there would seem to be no room for
mediation and its conciliatory process.
It is at least possible, however, that some medical malpractice cases would
benefit from the use of mediation. Increasing evidence suggests that parties
want something in addition to a monetary payment. Plaintiffs may want to
know why something happened. They want to be heard and have an
opportunity to express their anxieties over what has happened, and at times
they want an apology. Occasionally, they just want to know "it will never
20. See Lawrence Mann, Mediation of Civil Cases: Neither Panacea Nor Anathema (A Prescription for
Change in Procedural Rules), 67 U Detroit L Rev 531 (1990).
21. See, for example, Thomas Brady, ed, Dispute Resolution and the Courts: A Report on the National
Conference on Dispute Resolution and the Courts (Nat'l Inst Disp Resolution, State Justice Institute, and
NCSC Publication, 1989); Linda Singer, The Quiet Revolution in Dispute Settlement, 7 Mediation Q 105
(1989).
22. Steven Lubet, Some Early Observations on an Experiment with Mandatory Mediation, 1989 J Disp
Resolution 235; Thomas Fee, ed, What We Know-And Don't Know-About Mediation, Disp Resolution
Forum 9-13 (October 1989); Bruce Tallcott, Court-Ordered Mediation in Florida, 23 Mediation Q 77
(1989).
23. See, for example, Mich Comp L § 600.4903 (1990).
24. Texas Civil Prac & Rem Code Ann § 154.
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happen again." 2 5 Mediation, by providing a means for doctors to explain why
something was done the way it was, conceivably offers an inexpensive method
of resolving such claims without litigation. For these reasons, certain medical
malpractice cases may benefit from mediation.
One of the most focused and comprehensive efforts to utilize mediation
techniques in the malpractice context has occurred in Wisconsin. As detailed
in' the next section, Wisconsin replaced its malpractice screening panel
procedure with a new comprehensive regime, ostensibly described as
mediation, and required its use. A careful review of Wisconsin's approach
should therefore provide important insights into mediation's potential utility
in resolving malpractice disputes.
III
MANDATORY MEDIATION OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CLAIMS: THE
WISCONSIN EXPERIENCE
A. Panel Structure and Procedures
As other states moved towards voluntary arbitration or certificates of
merit, or retained ongoing versions of fact-finding prescreening panels,
Wisconsin took a different path. In a special legislative session in May 1986,
the Wisconsin legislature enacted Act 340 requiring prelitigation mediation
for all medical malpractice claims.2 6 As a product of intense lobbying and
political activity within the state from 1985 to 1986, the legislation replaced a
mandatory pre-screening panel system-the Patient Compensation Panels
("PCPs")-in operation since 1975 with the new mandatory mediation panel
system ("MMPS").2 7
25. See Ann Kellett, Healing Angry Wounds: The Role of Apology and Mediation in Disputes Between
Physicians and Patients, 1987 J Disp Resolution 11; Karl Slaikeu, Designing Dispute Resolution Systems in
the Health Care Industry, 5 NegotiationJ 395 (1989); Marlynn May & Daniel B. Stengel, Who Sues Their
Doctors? How Patients Handle Medical Grievances, 24 L & Soc'y Rev 105 (1990); Comment, Mediation and
Medical Malpractice Disputes: Potential Obstacles in the Traditional Lawyer's Perspective, 1990 J Disp
Resolution 371.
26. Wis Stat § 655-6.
27. The PCPs took one of two forms (a formal five-member panel or an informal three-member
panel) and determined negligence and causation, and awarded compensation. The constitutionality
of the panels was upheld in 1978. See State ex rel Strykowski v Wilkie, 81 Wis 2d 491, 261 NW2d 434
(1978). Wisconsin State Medical Society figures for 1980-84 suggest that the number of paid claims
increased 142% and average payments increased 65% in that period. The Office of the Director of
State Courts nevertheless reported that the PCPs successfully screened out one-third of claims
coming to them either by voluntary or involuntary dismissal, and settled another one-third of those
that came to panels. See Office of the Director for State Courts, Status Report on the Medical Mediation
Panel System in Wisconsin (1987-89) (covering September 1, 1986, to December 31, 1988, in three
reports) ("Status Report"); Molly Plunkett, The Patient Compensation Panels System: A Review of the Evidence
1986 (unpub essay, U Wis Law School) (on file with author). The popular press reported at that time
that panels resolved 90% of the claims but were not reducing the costs associated with medical
malpractice litigation. Milwaukee Journal IB, 2B (September 24, 1987). Diverse criticisms assailed
PCPs: they were seen to be inefficient, biased in favor of physicians or the plaintiffs' bar (depending
on who was speaking), and unable to reduce perceived high costs of litigation or lower the number of
cases going on to jury trial. These criticisms intensified during the 1985-86 legislative session, and a
political compromise bill led to the enactment of Act 340.
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Under the new statute, claimants are required to file a request for
mediation within fifteen days of filing their malpractice claim. A claimant may
also request mediation before filing. (This study identifies these claims as
"prefiling" claims.) The statute of limitations for all causes of action is tolled
for the ninety-day mediation period and an additional thirty days following
the end of the mediation period. Parties must submit a statement of the claim
or rebuttal to a claim, and share all patient health care records in their
possession. Conducting discovery, such as depositions of witnesses and
additional compulsory production of records, is specifically prohibited during
the mediation period.
The Office of the Director of State Courts administers the panel program.
The enacting statute provided little detail on how the mediation system was to
be run; thus the administrative office developed its own set of guiding
principles and practices in the fall of 1986. Statutory guidelines 28 require
panels to consist of three members: an attorney who chairs the panel, a
physician or health professional with some expertise in the area of the claim,
and a public member appointed from a pool of names provided by the
governor. The panel members receive very little training: the attorney-
members receive three hours of instruction from a private mediator skilled in
mediation training, but the other panel members typically receive no
mediation training.
In operation, panel composition remains very similar to that of the PCPs.
At the invitation of the administrative office, most of the attorney-chairs of the
old panels continue to serve as chairs of the new mediation panels. Many
physicians now serving on the mediation panels served before as well. 29
Turnover occurs most frequently with the public member. Every two years,
the sitting governor changes all public appointments to state advisory
committees, boards, and other state service institutions. As part of this
reappointment, the statewide pool of approximately 200 people available for
mediation panels can change considerably. Each panel member assumes an
assigned role: the attorney assumes the role of the legal expert and mediating
chair, the physician that of the neutral medical expert, and the lay member
that of the "juror."30
Panels are to meet within the ninety-day mediation period. If a meeting
cannot be arranged, mediation proceeds only if both parties stipulate to an
extension. In practice, it appears that the mandatory nature of the process is
unenforceable. Many attorneys are by-passing mediation by various means.
In some claims, parties cannot meet within the ninety-day period and one
party does not agree to continue the mediation process. Conceivably, delay
and last-minute cancellations are purposeful in order to avoid mediation.
28. Wis Stat § 655.465(2).
29. Until 1986, physicians were required to serve on at least one PCP if asked by the state.
Under the MMPS, there is no compulsory service requirement; physicians who serve as MMPS
members do so voluntarily.
30. All members receive $150 per panel attended as well as minor reimbursements for travel
and meals.
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Recent Wisconsin judicial decisions have held that failing to mediate within
the ninety-day period does not vitiate a claimant's right to pursue the claim in
court. 31 Some high-value claims can by-pass mediation altogether if the
MMPS office-in the exercise of administrative discretion 32-determines
mediation is unlikely to promote settlement or assist the negotiation process.
The project data base indicates that 15 percent of the claims are excused from
mediation by MMPS each year.
Parties must attend the mediation session unless excused by the MMPS
office. Panel sessions are informal and nonbinding; no records are kept, and
nothing said in a session is admissible in a subsequent court action. In theory,
panels do not render decisions. They are to facilitate compromise and
settlement where possible, but if mediation does not produce agreement,
panel members are then free to advise parties on their projections of the likely
outcome should the case proceed to trial. 33
B. Research Methodology
The Wisconsin program requires examination in an innovative manner.
This study attempts a contextual evaluation of the MMPS by locating the
panels within a "social field" 34 influenced by many factors, including the
incidence and nature of medical malpractice occurrences, health care delivery
systems, doctor-patient relations, consumer interests, and the economics of
health care and medical insurance. The study also locates the panels within
31. In Gauger v Mueller, 149 Wis 2d 737, 439 NW2d 637 (Wis Ct App 1989), the court held that
the statutory language establishing the ninety-day period for conducting mediation was a directive
(to the courts) rather than a mandate. Therefore the plaintiffs' failure to mediate within the statutory
period did not preclude the trial court from exercising jurisdiction over the claim or allowing an
untimely mediation. See Schulz v Nienhuis, 152 Wis 2d 434, 448 NW2d 655 (1989); Scheunemann v
Rowe, 156 Wis 2d 302, 456 NW2d 302 (1990); Eby v Kozarek, 153 Wis 2d 75, 450 NW2d 249 (1990).
32. There is no provision in the statute for by-passing mediation; thus one could argue that the
MMPS office is inappropriately allowing some cases to avoid mediation. However the legislation
provides that the state intended the process to provide an "informal, inexpensive and expedient
means for resolving disputes without litigation and intends that the director administer the
mediation system accordingly." Wis Stat § 655.42 (1). This language arguably allows the director
the latitude he has exercised in administering the program.
33. Standard descriptions of the typical session mention that parties, through their attorneys,
present a brief oral statement of their case, followed by ex parte meetings with the panel. The
mediators are supposed to
discuss the strengths and weaknesses of the case, discuss their recommended disposition or
settlement figure and ascertain the "bottom line" settlement positions of the parties. The
mediators continue shuttling back and forth between the parties for the ex parte discussions
until the matter is resolved or until the parties reach an impasse, at which time the session is
concluded and the mediators provide the parties with their objective evaluation of the case.
Office of the State Courts, Status Report on the Medical Mediation Panel System in Wisconsin 3-4 (1989)
(report for 1988) ("1988 Status Report").
It is interesting to note that the formal description of the process as described by the
administering office in its reports to the legislature changed between 1988 and 1989. For example,
the italicized portions of the above paragraph did not appear in the earlier report.
34. The terms "social field" and "legal field" are adaptations of Pierre Bordieu's notion of the
"juridical field." See Pierre Bordieu, The Force of Law: Toward A Sociology of the Legal Field, 38 Hastings
L J 805 (1987). The terms are used here to denote areas of structured, socially defined activity or
practices that affect individual and group behavior, and their impact on the creation, generation, and
revision of social and legal institutions.
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an equally complex "legal field" 5 of personal injury litigation within which
lawyers, judges, and ADR advocates compete and interact, motivated by
disparate concerns for, respectively, aggressive advocacy of clients' interests,
efficient docket management, and economical negotiation and settlement of
disputes. The study uses methods of inquiry that emphasize and assess the
unique features of the MMPS and provide a way for interested system
participants and observers to contribute to the assessment process.36
The project conceptualizes the MMPS as an intervention into, and
additional component of, the normal bargaining and settlement structures
operating within the state court system. The field of dispute resolution can be
seen as a collection of legal strategies and remedies. Negotiation and
bargaining between parties occurs continually during the disputing process-
from the time a claim is voiced, blame is asserted, and redress is demanded,
through the period of formal litigation. 37
The MMPS has the potential to affect a particular segment of claims within
what might be called the "bargaining/settlement pyramid." '38 Specifically,
one of its purposes is to emphasize the processing and settlement of small
claims that might not otherwise be able to proceed because of the high
transaction costs of litigation, and meritless claims, which the state and
respondent wish to remove from the courts as soon as possible. MMPS is
seen as freezing the pretrial portion of the bargaining pyramid for one last
effort at negotiation and settlement while transaction costs remain low. One
purpose of this study is to determine whether mediation at this stage is
effective in achieving these two stated MMPS goals.
Various data-gathering techniques have been used to accumulate
information on the MMPS. First, the project constructed a data base for a
universe of 870 claims filed and mediated between September 1, 1986, and
December 31, 1988. Second, the project observed twenty mediation sessions
35. See note 34.
36. Particularly helpful in devising the current study have been the writings and insights ofJohn
Esser, Evaluations of Dispute Processing: We Do Not Know What We Think and We Do Not Think What We
Know, 66 Denver U L Rev 499 (1988-89), and Michael Patton, Creative Evaluation (Sage Publications,
1981), on evaluation research; Marc Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and
Don't Know (and Think We Know) About our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L Rev 4
(1983); Marc Galanter, The Radiating Effects of Courts, in Keith Boyum & Lynn Mather, eds, Empirical
Theories about Courts (Longman, 1983); Marc Galanter, The Emergence of the Judge as a Mediator in Civil
Cases, 69 Judicature 257 (1986); Marc Galanter, The Day After the Litigation Explosion, 46 Md L Rev 3
(1986); Robert Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce,
88 Yale LJ 950 (1979), on lawyer bargaining and negotiation practices; and Peter C. Carstensen, Two
Causes for the Predictable Failure of Contemporary Tort "Reform ". Naive Analysis and Ignorance of Institutional
Interaction, 1987 Detroit Col L Rev 975 (1987), on the multi-institutional aspects of medical
malpractice incidence, claims, and litigation.
37. Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves " Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 L &
Soc'y Rev 95 (1974); Richard Miller & Austin Sarat, Grievances, Claims and Disputes: Assessing the
Adversary Culture, 15 L & Soc'y Rev 525 (1981).
38. Marc Galanter originally suggested the image of a "bargaining" pyramid. See Miller &
Sarat, 15 L & Soc'y Rev at 544- 45 (cited in note 37). See also Stephen Daniels & Lori Andrews, The
Shadow of the Law: Jury Decisions in Obstetrics and Gynecology Cases (Am Bar Foundation Working Paper
#8806, 1988) ("Dispute resolution pyramid" describes the broad pool of medical incidents from
which medical malpractice claims against health providers might arise.).
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between October 1988 and April 1989. Third, the researchers conducted a
series of informal interviews with lawyers, panel members, parties, and others
in attendance at the mediation sessions. Finally, the project sponsored a
round-table discussion on the mediation system attended by physicians,
attorneys, consumers, scholars, mediators, and state policymakers.
C. Early Findings
Preliminary findings provided here fall into three general categories: (1)
filing and processing patterns as reflected in available summary reports from
the MMPS office and early findings from the specially constructed-project data
base; (2) a special review of all settled claims occurring between September 1,
1986, and December 31, 1988; and (3) a description of the mediation process
as observed in the panel sessions.
1. Filing and Processing Patterns. The MMPS office reports provide summary
data on claim disposition. 39 As of early 1988, of the first 250 completed
sessions, the MMPS appeared to be "settling" or resolving only 9 percent of
the claims. In 15 percent of the claims, no settlement occurred and the
statute of limitations expired without the claimant filing suit. In 7 percent of
the claims, there was no settlement and claimants were still considering suing.
The remaining 69 percent of the claims proceeded to court. In approximately
half of these claims, at least one of the parties indicated that the mediation
had served a "constructive purpose." MMPS reports do not define what
"constructive purpose" means, but oral interviews with the MMPS
administrator and others participating in the process suggest that this term
typically refers to a weeding out of unnecessary parties or to the clarification
of legal issues related to a claim.
Table 1 compares this information with that provided in the recent MMPS
report of 1989 for the next 150 additional completed claims (for the period
ending December 31, 1988). Table 1 not only reveals how few claims settle at
mediation, but also indicates that fewer claims are settling over time and that
fewer people are finding the process helpful.
39. Reports of the Office of the Director for State Courts, 1987-90 (four reports covering
September 1, 1986, to December 31, 1989) (on file with author). These reports must be used with
some caution, since they do not fully identify or clarify the types of mediated claims to which the
different tables and summaries refer. Complete information about the disposition of all 870 claims
mediated since 1986 is not available at this time. However, a quick overview of claims processing is
provided in official MMPS summary reports issued annually since 1987 and available in data from the
project data base.
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TABLE 1
MMPS INFORMATION ON CLAIMS THAT HAVE COMPLETED MEDIATION
First 250 Claims Next 150 Claims Total (400)
A. Settled at or shortly after session 22 ( 9%) 6 ( 4%) 28 ( 7.0%)
B. Not Settled, not filed, SL expired 37 (15%) 36 (24%) 73 (18.2%)
C. Not settled, not filed, SL still running 18 ( 7%) -8 (-5%) 10 ( 2.5%)
D. Not settled, filed in court but
mediation did serve constructive
purpose 80 (32%) 43 (32%) 128 (32.0%)
E. Not settled, filed in court, and
mediation did not serve constructive
purpose 93 (37%) 68 (45%) 161 (40.3%)
These reports reveal a high number of claims where there is no mediated
settlement, no court action has commenced, and the statute of limitations has
expired (category B in Table 1). The number of claims in this category
increased in the last several months of the period of review; such claims
account for almost 20 percent of all filed claims. To some, this indicates that
the program has been successful in weeding out frivolous or meritless claims
before they get into the system. Parties are presumed to have heeded
negative readings from the mediation panel and decided not to press a
questionable claim.
This may be occurring. 40 However, it is too early in the study of the
mediation program to draw such a conclusion. We simply do not yet know
enough about what occurs following mediation and why. For example, it is
just as possible that the parties who dropped their claims found mediation of
no help, or were prevented from acting for other reasons, for example, lack of
adequate legal counsel or finances. Until the interviews and case studies now
underway are completed, no conclusions can be asserted on why these claims
were not pursued.
2. Review of Settled Claims. Available information suggests that the medical
mediation panels rarely reach a settlement at the mediation stage. Of 870
claims filed between September 1, 1986, and December 31, 1988, MMPS
records indicate that only thirty-five cases (4 percent) reached settlement
during or in conjunction with the mediation session. 4 1 A case is deemed
40. Civil justice research has suggested that increased institutionalization of grievance
procedures legitimizes the complaining process, actually increasing the number of grievances and
claims voiced, and simultaneously allowing for careful pre-hearings of the claims to expose those that
are more meritorious. Meritless claims will be identified and will drop out. Fewer disputes will
actually be pursued and there will be higher rates of success for those meritorious claims that stay in
the system to completion. See, for example, Miller & Sarat, 15 L & Soc'y Rev at 545 (cited in note
37). Such a theory would be compatible with those who argue the large dropout rate is a success.
41. The inclusion of some of these claims in the settled category seems inappropriate, given
what we know about the MMPS process. Parties and their attorneys do not meet with the mediation
panel until the date of the hearing. Arrangements for the panel are handled from the Madison office,
and parties are generally prohibited from contacting even the attorney-chair of the panel prior to the
date of the session. It is possible that the "threat" of going to the mediation session may prove to be
a stimulant to settlement, much as the threat of a firm date for trial encourages last-minute
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settled by the administrative office when it is fully resolved by an exchange of
money at, or within three to four weeks of, the mediation session.4
2
A special review of the settled claims reveals interesting information on
the types of cases that have settled. It also points out the malleable nature of
the phrase "settled due to mediation" and invites discussion about the
negotiating process that seems to be occurring in and around medical
malpractice mediation. Settled claims are listed as those that settled at the
session (eight of thirty-five), those that settled shortly after the session
(thirteen of thirty-five), those that settled prior to mediation (ten of
thirty-five), those that were withdrawn by the claimant or dismissed prior to
the session (three of thirty-five), and one case that had not settled after two
years of having filed the claim but that had been targeted as "likely to settle"
by the attorney-chair (one of thirty-five). As Table 2 indicates, over 75
percent of these settlements were classified as "prefiling," that is, prior to
commencement of a circuit court action.
TABLE 2
PROFILE OF SETTLED CLAIMS
Pre-Filing Post-Filing
Claims Claims Total
Settled at Session 4 4 8
Settled Shortly After Session 11 2 13
Settled Prior to Session 8 2 10
Withdrawn/Dismissed or Session Canceled 2 1 3
Other 1 0 1
Totals 26 9 35
By almost any measure of program settlement rates, the MMPS settlement
rate must be considered extremely low. Furthermore, the number of claims
settled appears to be declining over time. Twelve of the thirty-five settled
claims were filed between September 1 and December 31, 1986, the first four
months of operation. 4 3 Of these twelve, three settled at the session and four
settled shortly after the session; all but one were "prefiling" claims. Most of
settlements. But it seems strained to label claims that were withdrawn or settled prior to a session as
"settled due to mediation." Subtracting these claims, a more likely figure of settled claims is
approximately twenty (2.4%), not thirty-five. Nevertheless, until more is discerned about the
classification of settled claims, this article will continue to discuss the characteristics of all thirty-five
cases deemed settled by the MMPS office.
42. The attorney-chair is supposed to submit a report on the results of the session within one
month; most comply. The MMPS office indicates that parties' counsel typically call the panel chair or
sometimes the Madison office to notify them of a decision either to settle the claim or litigate in
circuit court. Lawyers are required to indicate the latter move in writing to the Madison office;
review of available files suggest they rarely do.
43. Between June i, 1986, and September 1, 1986, when the old PCPs were no longer operating
and the MMPS had yet to begin, claimants with pending claims and those with new ones had the
option of choosing to go to mediation or directly to state court. Few-some assert only 7-9%--chose
to mediate during that period, and many were fearful that there would be a glut of malpractice claims
going to county circuit courts starting in June 1987. See, for example, Nathan Heffernan, State of the
Judiciary, 59 Wis Bar Bull 10 (1986).
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these were settled within three to five months, but two took up to one year to
settle. Of the last 150 claims to go through the process, only six settled.44
An avowed purpose of the MMPS is to settle small claims, and thus it is of
interest to look at the settlement amounts of the settled cases. In eighteen
instances, the settlement amount was undisclosed. Typical disclosed
settlement amounts ranged from $2,000 to $33,300. The highest settlement
amount was $600,000-a pro se claim from northern Wisconsin brought
against a hospital alleging negligence in the birth of a child born with
neurological problems. It would appear that the MMPS did remove several
small claims from the system. However, full correlation of settled versus
unsettled claims must be undertaken before we can understand why cases
actually settled at the mediation stage.
3. The Mediation Process As Observed. Observations of mediation panel
sessions throughout Wisconsin between October 1988 and April 1989 reveal
interesting details on panel operations, the roles assumed by panel members,
and the degree of control exercised by claimants, respondents, and attorneys.
During these observations, attention was paid to how panel members fulfilled
their assigned roles and to the level of participation by claimants and
respondents. A brief description of the process as observed, organized by the
roles played by participants in the process, is provided below.
a. Attorney-chairs. In the cases observed, the panel attorney-chairs
exerted great control over the panels and their proceedings. The chairs (they
were all men) outlined the purpose, goals, and procedure that panel members
were to follow, coordinated the flow of parties and lawyers into the mediation
session, and remained in control throughout the session. Most lawyers who
served as panel chairs were "repeat players" 45 in two senses of the phrase.
Between thirty-five and forty attorneys from the available statewide pool of
about eighty-five possible attorney-chairs had served previously on a PCP
panel. Thus the MMPS-using its discretion in arranging who will serve as
panel chairs-exercised an understandable tendency to return to those
lawyers who showed interest and ability in trying to make the system work. Of
the available pool of attorneys willing to serve as mediators, a small core
group of twenty attorneys actually handled most of the sessions each year. 46
Most attorney-chairs were experienced personal injury lawyers, roughly
split between the plaintiff and defense bars. Most considered their efforts akin
to pro bono work, in that the $150 per session fee was significantly less than
they could earn in their normal practice in the same time. Attorney-chair
44. Of the thirty-five claims that MMPS list as settled due to mediation, eleven were from
southeastern Wisconsin and eleven were from Madison and southwest Wisconsin; these two regions
encompass the largest percentage of the state's population. Seven claims were from west central and
northwestern Wisconsin, and six were from east central and northeastern Wisconsin. It is not
surprising that the most populous areas of the state produce two-thirds of the state's claims.
45. Galanter, 9 L & Soc'y Rev at 95, 97 (cited in note 37).
46. Three different attorneys chaired ten of the twenty sessions I observed, even though I made
a conscious effort to avoid sessions chaired by someone I had already seen.
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styles ranged the gamut of available models of lawyer and mediator behavior.
Individiial characteristics, background, and age certainly accounted for some
of these differences. In two instances, the chairs appeared to exceed the limits
of propriety or at least of discretion. 47 Some chairs in rural areas were more
relaxed, informal, and humorous throughout the sessions, and made a point
to talk to the parties and ask them to speak for themselves. This suggests the
possibility of regional or local legal culture as a factor in mediating and
bargaining patterns. 48
b. Physician/hospital panel members. Physician or hospital panel members
typically fulfill their assigned roles ably as the medical expert for their field.
In most observed sessions, other panel members and parties' lawyers asked
the health members numerous questions about the medical issues presented
in the claims. Many physicians drew diagrams to explain medical procedures
pertaining to the case at hand, and in two instances the doctors examined the
claimants for a visual identification of the alleged injury, after having obtained
permission to do so from the claimants and their counsel.
Some doctors specializing in areas within which claims frequently arise
were used repeatedly, as were physicians retired from practice. (Fifty percent
of the physicians actively serving on the panels are retired.) Some panel
physicians appeared to be affected somewhat by their advancing ages. There
may be a problem obtaining adequate and reliable physician input, given the
voluntary nature of physician service under the present scheme. Physicians
who do participate indicated that they do so out of a sense of civic duty and an
interest in reducing medical malpractice litigation.
c. The lay panel member. The least operational panel member was the lay
member, whose role was akin to that of a juror. Rarely did the lay member
perform this function with great enthusiasm or insight. In the twenty sessions
observed, few lay members asked questions or provided opinions on issues in
the cases. In some instances, it was obvious the member had not read the file;
many typically spent session time looking over the notes and medical records
referred to by the doctor on the panel. In two sessions, the lay members did
not speak, and in yet another session the lay member insisted on telling her
own lengthy medical history as an analogy to the claim being presented that
day. Although not all lay members were uninterested or ineffective, project
47. In one instance, the chair opened the public session in front of all parties and their lawyers
with the statement, "Well, I am not sure why the hell we are here. We all know these mediation
panels don't work." In a different session, a different chair made an impolite remark about the
claimant in the matter. The claim involved an obese woman who brought suit for an allegedly failed
stomach stapling operation because she had not lost weight after one year. In a closed session of the
panel, the chair characterized the claim as trivial by saying, "Why should these Docs pay her money
when the real problem is she can't stop eating Twinkies?"
48. See Herbert Jacob,Justice in America.- Courts, Lawyers and the Judicial Process (Little, Brown, 4th
ed 1984), for a description of local legal culture in Wisconsin during the early operations of
Wisconsin's divorce reform legislation, which required a reconciliation hearing prior to no-fault
divorce proceedings.
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observations and the comments of many involved in the process suggest that
the lay member is not essential to the process.
d. Parties and their attorneys. Lawyers for the claimants and respondents
were assertive in controlling their clients' participation in the process. In all
but two sessions, claimants were present and all were represented by
counsel. 49 Some attorneys allowed their clients to speak openly; others did
not allow them to speak at all. In about one-third of the sessions, the
respondent physician or hospital representative was not present, such
absences having been approved for cause by the MMPS office. There was no
direct exchange between the claimant and the respondents in any of the
observed sessions. The degree to which the respondents spoke at all
depended upon the control exercised by the lawyers; when they did speak, it
was only in closed session, with the claimant absent.
D. Critiques of the Process by Panel System Participants
Lawyers and their clients commonly cite three major problems with the
MMPS. First, claimants' and respondents' lawyers both argue that the lack of
discovery limits their ability to find out what happened. According to their
argument, mediation thus occurs before sufficient information is available for
a reasoned settlement. As a result of inadequate medical information, panel
members had difficulty estimating levels of injury, causation, and degree of
harm. While possibly reducing costs to the parties, as intended, the
prohibition on discovery seems to impede, rather than promote, settlement.
Second, many defense attorneys assert that the statutorily required
reporting of any settlement payment by respondents to the State Medical
Examining Board inhibits settlement.50  Some physicians fear retaliation,
investigation, and increased malpractice insurance rates if reports are made,
regardless of the amount of or reason for the settlement. For this reason,
small claims that typically would settle are not settling. While observations
did reveal several small claims in which the respondent physician and the
attorney for the physician's insurer declined to settle for these reasons, 51
preliminary interview data with physicians who have settled claims via the
MMPS indicate their highest priority is to avoid the stress of going to court.
Moreover, physicians who are reported to the State Medical Examining Board
are not at risk. A recent study revealed that while the number of filings and
investigations have increased (due to 1985-86 changes in the law making it
49. These observations are taken from the twenty sessions I observed. Of all the cases I
attempted to observe, I was refused access to only one, which involved a pro se claimant.
50. Wis Stat § 655.26.
51. One session involved a seemingly valid claim of physician error in intubation during surgery
that had caused severe dental problems needing repair. A claim of $8,000 was about to be settled for
half that amount, but at the last minute the respondent's attorney refused to proceed, on the grounds
that the claim was unjust and that even that amount of payment would have to be reported.
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mandatory), files are still processed slowly, and there is an extensive backlog
of cases. Few cases result in disciplinary action.52
The third common complaint among participants is the panels' lack of
power to enforce their recommendations or decisions, which inherently
weakens the process' effect. Since the process is nonbinding, informal, and
off the record, some assert that lawyers can simply attend, put in their time,
and, in the case of the defense bar, add billable hours.
The assumption is questionable that mediators should be able to enforce a
session accommodation or recommendation. That some people think they
ought to lends keen insight into commonly held expectations of the process at
work in Wisconsin. Lawyers and clients observed in the twenty sessions
typically wanted closure, certainty, and a decision; they appeared frustrated by
the open-ended process promoted by the mediation panels. Many parties and
their attorneys-both those observed and attorneys interviewed-appear to
find the advice and opinions of the panel of little value.
At this juncture, one is left with a conundrum: fewer claims are coming
each year to the MMPS 53 and most claims that do come for mediation are now
filed simultaneously in circuit court. This suggests that fewer attorneys and
clients perceive the process to be a viable option before resorting to litigation.
MMPS has a very low settlement rate, and over 70 percent of the claims going
through mediation end up at least starting the traditional civil litigation
process in the state court system.5 4
MMPS may actually be discouraging mediation. Claims may be settled
early or be abandoned because MMPS is seen as a waste of time. Settlement
may be taking place either on the road to the courthouse steps-just as it
always has-or before commencement of any formal claims, without help
from the MMPS. Many things remain opaque at this time in the study of the
Wisconsin scheme, but at least we know that very little settlement is occurring
and that many people feel the system has little positive value.
IV
ANALYSIS AND ASSESSMENT
The preceding description, albeit preliminary in many respects, suggests
that the present operation of the MMPS differs greatly from what one might
assume to be a typical mediation process. Unlike most mediation processes,
the MMPS allows for little direct party participation, results in few mediated
52. Medical Discipline in Wisconsin: No Cure in Sight (Ctr Pub Rep and Wis Acad Trial Lawyers,
April 1989).
53. In 1989, claims filed with the MMPS declined for the third straight year, from a high of 454
claims in 1985 down to 398 (1987), 353 (1988), and 339 (1989). Office of the Director for State
Courts, Status Report (cited in note 27).
54. All claims that continue in the traditional state court system do not, however, end up in trial.
Widely known statistics on civil litigation suggest that nine out of every ten claims are settled before
trial, David Trubek, et al, Civil Litigation Research Project Final Report (Disp Proc Res Program, 1987),
and, in Wisconsin last year, there were less than fifty completed medical malpractice jury trials (oral
testimony at the legislative hearings on tort reform (Madison, March 1990)).
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settlements, and does little to promote harmony, reciprocal understanding of
party needs, or active processes for interaction and joint resolution of
problems. MMPS is certainly not mediation in its classic sense. One
possibility is that the MMPS has developed a hybrid scheme of mediation
peculiar to the medical malpractice context. Jay Folberg and Alison Taylor
note that sometimes "the nature of the conflict, the setting, the resources and
experience of the disputants, and the background and training. of the
mediator [can be] so diverse that [mediation] models are illusory [and the]
unique demands of the controversy being mediated may require an eclectic
approach."55 The present makeup of the mediation panels-drawing upon its
historical ties to the PCP process-has led to an eclectic mediation approach.
Even if this is so, few positive attributes can be identified within such a system
that leads to so few mediated agreements, allows so little participation for
parties, 56 and results in 92 to 97 percent of its claims being abandoned or
heading toward the state courts. While there may be interest in settling claims
out of court, the parties and attorneys have shown little interest in adopting a
mediative approach of the type required to assist in settling malpractice
actions.
Two other possible explanations may describe the essence of the MMPS as
it currently functions. In one scheme, the panels can be seen as providing
what some refer to as "early neutral evaluation" of the case. Early neutral
evaluation is generally defined as an objective assessment of the strengths and
weaknesses of a case by an impartial panel early on in the proceedings of the
case. 57 MMPS guidelines indicate that the panel, if it appears that mediation
will not be productive, can ask the parties if they want to hear the panel's
opinion on liability and damages. The MMPS office now states that early
neutral evaluation is a primary function of the panels, especially as it may
apply to those cases that do not settle. 58 The office also reported to the
legislature that as of 1988 the panel procedure requires this function. 59 If
early neutral evaluation is indeed occurring, MMPS may be providing a useful
role in the sorting out of claims. However, project findings indicate that it is
still too early to conclude that MMPS operates in this manner. We still have
no real explanation of why claims stop at the mediation level, and no
conclusive evidence that the panels act as an early neutral evaluation forum.
55. Folberg & Taylor, Mediation at 131 (cited in note 11).
56. Party satisfaction with dispute processing schemes and their attendant results is often
asserted as both a positive goal for alternative schemes and a valid measure by which to judge
process quality. See Jessica Pearson, An Evaluation of Alternatives to Court Adjudication, 7 Just Sys J 420
(1982); compare David Luban, The Quality of Justice, 66 Denver U L Rev 381 (1989). Anecdotal
evidence and my observations suggest high levels of dissatisfaction with the Wisconsin MMPS, and
perhaps even more important, simple confusion about the process in which the participants were
involved. In one session I observed, a claimant kept assuming she was being attacked by the panel
and kept asking the chair, "When can I defend myself?"
57. See, for example, Wayne Brazil, et al, Early Neutral Evaluation: An Experimental Effort to Expedite
Dispute Resolution, 69 Judicature 279 (1986).
58. Office of the State Courts, 1988 Status Report at 3-4 (cited in note 33).
59. See note 33.
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Another likely explanation is that lawyers are getting together and settling
these cases on their own, within well-known and reliable negotiating
parameters. To show a significant role as an innovative processing institution,
MMPS would have to prove that it is settling claims at an earlier stage or
claims that otherwise would not settle. There is no such conclusive evidence.
Moreover, previous discussion of the high numbers of claims that settle
before mediation or drop out of the system following the session suggest that
lawyers might be increasing negotiation ahead of time, avoiding the MMPS,
and resolving claims themselves through standard negotiating and bargaining
techniques. Indeed, recent information on the drop in the number of claims
filed with the MMPS leads one to surmise that practice patterns are being
altered to avoid the MMPS altogether.
V
CONCLUSION
WHAT NEXT FOR WISCONSIN?
Concluding that the Wisconsin panel system does not conform to
conventional or even unconventional definitions of mediation does not mean
that mediation is inappropriate for medical malpractice claims. Many of the
potential justifications for mediation remain intact, even if unfulfilled in
Wisconsin.
The present challenge is twofold. First, we must identify the primary goal
or goals we want to achieve through the alternative resolution of medical
malpractice claims-distinguishing between valid and invalid claims, settling
valid claims early to reduce congestion in state courts, saving money for the
parties and the courts, and balancing participant interests and needs, or party
reconciliation. Second, we must improve existing structures and procedures
to allow the system to achieve and promote those goals.
Program reform is never as easy as it appears, and it is early in the
evaluation process to begin making such recommendations for retooling the
mediation process in Wisconsin. Two possible avenues for program reform-
one rights-based and the other interests-based-can be sketched
preliminarily. These suggestions make several assumptions both about what
might work in Wisconsin and about what the state's goals would be for each
redesign effort.
In a rights-based reform, the state's primary goals would remain focused
on settlement, cost reductions, and compromise to keep claims from entering
the state courts. Because of the apparent lack of interest among attorneys, the
medical profession, and others in fostering a climate for mediation, this
approach seems reasonable. In this scheme, an emphasis would be placed on
providing a fair hearing and discussion of the rights of the parties in the hope
that settlement could be reached and litigation avoided. Political realities may
limit the prospects for change, but a new focus on the panels as a settlement
tool might include: (1) redefinition of the panel process from mediation to a
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mandatory negotiated settlement process expressly providing early neutral
evaluation; (2) expanded opportunities for discovery, which would provide
parties more information at an earlier stage in the negotiation process; and
(3) a two-tiered process of panel hearings, which would require a mandatory
hearing early in the process after limited discovery and a second mandatory
panel hearing prior to trial. This scheme would allow claimants to continue to
explore their claims and would demand that the physician-respondents take
the claims seriously. At the same time, it requires little of the parties other
than two mandatory meetings, and provides the parties an opportunity to
meet in the hope that settlement can be reached. This approach emphasizes
negotiation and settlement in a ights-based process of exchange and
negotiation; it recognizes the role informal settlement processes may still play
in complex litigation that typically ends up in private settlements or jury trials,
but abandons any attempt to look like mediation. 60
An interests-based approach would attempt to create a truly mediative
approach to medical malpractice claims. It would assume that the primary
goal is to provide parties an opportunity to reach a consensual agreement to
the claim and reconcile their interests, needs, and feelings in an informal
procedure over which they have control. It would allow for substantial input
into the process and participation for parties, as opposed to their attorneys; it
would encourage early settlement of the issues but allow for mediation at any
stage in the overall resolution process. Mandatory mediation under this
scheme would require significant changes in the present system. Examples of
the necessary changes include the creation of (1) a mediation process in which
parties are referred to a neutral, trained mediator, who perhaps would be
assisted by a physician who specializes in the area of medicine relevant to the
claim; (2) a multileveled process by which mediation can take place in stages,
before and after parties have begun formal litigation, thus allowing for
different levels of discovery and exploration of the claim; (3) an "opt-out"
process for assessing the suitability of claims for mediation, recognizing that
some claims are less likely to benefit from mediation; and (4) a process for
internal evaluation and program revision. 6 1
Both the rights-based settlement and the interests-based mediation
schemes retain ample room for variation. Either scheme, carefully crafted,
could provide adequate protections for individual rights and public interests
and simultaneously give some relief to beleaguered patients, judges, and
physicians exhausted by the tension, trauma, and expense of unfortunate
medical incidents and medical malpractice litigation. Either scheme would
60. Compare Note, Mandatory Mediation and Summary jury Trial. Guidelines for Ensuring Fair and
Effective Processes, 103 Harv L Rev 1086 (1990), for a description of "rights-based mediation." The
author indicates that "rights-based mediation focuses on the rights the disputants would have in
court . . .and uses those rights to develop parameters within which the parties might resolve the
dispute." Id at 1088.
61. See Law and Public Policy Committee of the Society of Professionals in Dispute Resolution,
Mandated Participation and Settlement Coercion: Dispute Resolution as It Relates to the Courts (discussion
draft, 1990).
[Vol. 54: No. I
Page 195: Winter 19911 MEDIATION AND MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 215
also require a balancing of competing interests and rights and, thus,
significant legislative and consumer activity to achieve the sought-after
changes. In spite of the difficulties presented, this author remains optimistic
about the possibilities of serious reform. There is growing evidence of
innovation among the courts and the bar in Wisconsin, evidenced in part by
the creation of a new study group on ADR by the State Judicial Council and by
the State Bar's new committee on ADR. Medical communities and
professional groups are expressing a willingness to explore innovations by
means of in-house resolution and conciliation efforts, and the State Office of
the Commissioner of Insurance is involving state malpractice insurance
providers in an evaluation of claims settlement practices. The question
remains whether those involved will be interested enough to accept the
challenge of making the alternative resolution of medical malpractice claims
an effective-and perhaps truly mediative-process.

